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Facing the Dictators: Anthony Eden, the Foreign Office and
British Intelligence, 1935–1945
Daniel W. B. Lomas
School of Arts and Media, The University of Salford, Salford, Greater Manchester, UK
ABSTRACT
This article uses the inter-war and wartime career of Anthony Eden, as a
vehicle to understand the little understood relationship between secret
intelligence, British Foreign Secretaries and the Foreign Office. While
secret intelligence is no longer the ‘missing dimension’, it once was in
studies of diplomatic and political history, its use by British Foreign
Secretaries remains a neglected subject. The article also sheds important
new light on the Foreign Office’s wartime use of intelligence, especially
diplomatic signals intelligence (SIGINT), a subject often overshadowed
by the use of military SIGINT from Bletchley Park, showing the close
relationship between intelligence officials and British diplomats in guid-
ing British foreign policy. As Foreign Secretary in the 1930s and 1940s,
Eden showed himself to be a skilful reader of intelligence reports, using
this information as he went about crafting Britain’s policy towards the





Office; Second World War;
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This article uses the inter-war and wartime career of Anthony Eden, to explore the relationship
between British intelligence, Foreign Secretaries and the Foreign Office. While the use of intelli-
gence to shape British foreign policy has been well documented, less is known about the use of
such information by individual Secretaries of State, and the relationship between the intelligence
community and the Foreign Office (FO) more generally. The article looks at the career of Eden in
particular as a case study on the role of intelligence and the Foreign Secretary, looking at his
access to and attitude towards intelligence, and the sometimes complex relationship Eden had
with Downing Street. While the attitudes of individual Secretaries of State towards intelligence
undoubtedly changed from individual to individual, the article suggests that Foreign Secretaries
have – as in Eden’s case – always received intelligence to shape decision making, even if they
have often tried to stay far removed from the details of intelligence collection or the day-to-run-
ning of Britain’s intelligence community. In the case of Eden, the evidence shows that he took
diplomatic, military and even open source intelligence seriously, establishing himself as an expe-
rienced intelligence consumer in government before and during the Second World War. This art-
icle therefore contributes to the literature on Eden’s career, while also offering wider
observations on Foreign Secretaries and intelligence, and the process of handling and dissemi-
nating such information in the Foreign Office.
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That the Foreign Secretary receives intelligence should come as little surprise; the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs has been responsible for ‘laying down the broad lines of British foreign
policy’, standing at the ‘apex of the pyramid of that section of the central government machinery
which is responsible for the management of Britain’s external relations’.1 For centuries, the
Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs had always been privy to information obtained through
the ‘Secret Vote’ – an annual fund to pay for intelligence, with this becoming just part of the
‘flow of information’ reaching the Foreign Secretary’s desk following the formal creation of
Britain’s intelligence organisations, with the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6), stemming
from the creation of the Secret Service Bureau in 1909, and in 1919 the Government Code &
Cipher School (GC&CS, from 1946 the Government Communications Headquarters).2 By 1919,
PUS Sir Charles Hardinge insisted that SIS’s overseas intelligence gathering should ‘be in the
hands of the Foreign Office’, which was the ‘only Government Department in a position to
decide whether such operations may or may not conflict with the general foreign policy of H.M.
Government’, overseeing secret service activity by ‘holding the purse strings’.3 From 1921, the
department also controlled GC&CS, which, despite its military origins, produced a ‘great bulk’ of
political information concerning the ‘Foreign Office primarily’. Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon
quickly recognised that GC&CS’s diplomatic reporting was ‘by far the most important branch of
our confidential work’ offering the ‘most accurate and … the cheapest, means of obtaining
secret political information’.4 FO control of overseas intelligence gathering and covert activity
has remained broadly the same; the Seymour Report of 1952 emphasised ‘The Foreign Secretary
is responsible in peace and in war for the S.I.S. … the S.I.S. cannot function abroad without the
cover provided by the Foreign Service’, and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (as the FO was
renamed in 1968) remains responsible for SIS and GCHQ, which operate under the ‘authority of
the Secretary of State’.5
Yet, despite the importance of the Foreign Secretary, few studies have looked at the roles of
individual Secretaries of State and their involvement with ‘secret service’. Commenting on the
relationship between intelligence and twentieth-century premiers, historian Christopher Andrew
once suggested that many basic questions had ‘yet to be asked, let alone answered’.6
Fortunately, the release of archival material has gone some way to filling this void though signifi-
cant gaps remain. In marked contrast, scholars have shown less inclination to look beyond the
fabled black door of Downing Street to other Whitehall departments, with Andrew’s observation
still a prescient one for Foreign Secretaries and other Cabinet posts. In case of the Foreign Office
(from 1968 the Foreign & Commonwealth Office or FCO)7, while it is possible to study the pre-
1945 use of ‘secret service’ by some Secretaries of State, their post-war successors have often
been circumspect on the subject. Despite occupying all four Great Offices of State – the Home
Office, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Foreign Secretary and, finally, Prime Minister, James
Callaghan’s memoirs omit his access to intelligence, with Callaghan often reluctant to discuss the
subject in public, even after government avowal of SIS and GCHQ in the 1990s. The memoirs of
another Labour Foreign Secretary, David (now Lord) Owen, contain a chapter on MI6, GCHQ and
the Falklands, setting out the ‘crucial role’ of intelligence in defence and foreign policy. As he
recalls, Owen was initially ‘sceptical about the system for referring intelligence cases with a polit-
ical context to the Foreign Secretary’, but ‘after a review of six months’ referrals, I was com-
pletely satisfied’ gradually growing to ‘respect the work of MI6, particularly in Southern Africa,
where they provided me with a lot of intelligence’.8 Owen was less impressed with the large
sums of money spent on Britain’s covert propaganda machinery, the Foreign Office’s Information
Research Department (IRD), ordering its disbandment and replacement with a smaller organisa-
tion to achieve ‘greater clarity’ in overseas information work.9 Conservative Foreign Secretary
Geoffrey Howe referred to the importance of SIS agent and KGB officer Oleg Gordievsky (mis-
spelt as ‘Gordievski’ in his memoirs) whose reports, seen only by himself, Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher and a few senior officials, convinced him that the Soviets ‘had a genuine fear
that “the West” was plotting their overthrow’.10 Asked about his access to intelligence by
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journalist Michael Cockerill, Sir Douglas Hurd replied how he ‘wasn’t left in ignorance … I had a
whole flow of information coming at me all the time’.11
Academic studies of the intelligence-policymaker relationship are equally silent on the role of
the Foreign Secretary. While we know the aspects of Harold Macmillan, Alec Douglas-Home,
James Callaghan and John Major’s relationship with intelligence in Downing Street, we know
very little about their formative experiences as Foreign Secretary, and the contrasting experien-
ces in handling intelligence in the Foreign Office and No. 10 – an observation that equally
applies to Eden. Still less is known about the use of intelligence by other Secretaries of State in
framing British diplomacy. Alan Bullock’s final volume of his three-part study of Labour Foreign
Secretary Ernest Bevin makes no reference to the Joint Intelligence Committee or SIS and GCHQ,
despite the importance of intelligence to the foreign policy of the post-war Attlee government.12
This is not to say that the role of Foreign Secretary is insignificant when it comes to intelligence
and security issues. Intelligence from Britain’s agencies has been an important source of informa-
tion, despite often embroiling the Foreign Secretary and senior officials in scandals when over-
seas operations go wrong. In September 1956, Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd congratulated the
Director of GCHQ, Eric Jones, on the ‘volume of material which has been produced … relating
to all the countries in the Middle East … I am writing to let you know how valuable we have
found this material and how much I appreciate the hard work and skill involved in its produc-
tion’ – something that Eden would do as wartime Foreign Secretary, even if the precise nature
of the information and its use is largely unknown.13 Sensitive intelligence collection or covert
operations require ministerial approval; in 1956, following one such failed operation, the dis-
appearance of navy diver Lionel ‘Buster’ Crabb during an SIS operation in Portsmouth harbour,
guidelines were put in place governing Ministerial authority and approval.14 Now the Foreign
Secretary sits on the National Security Council (NSC) reviewing all aspects of UK security, receiv-
ing information from the intelligence and security services.15
While the post-war experiences of Foreign Secretaries and intelligence has been largely
neglected, historians can now draw on the recently released records of the FO Permanent
Under-Secretary’s Department (PUSD) to study their pre-war and wartime predecessors.
Established in 1949, the PUSD fulfilled the long established role of the Permanent Under-
Secretary (PUS) in acting as the FO’s link to Britain’s intelligence agencies, with PUSD’s released
files up to 1951 giving a unique insight into the relationship between diplomats and intelli-
gence.16 The PUSD archive, supplemented by the files of the Cabinet Office, wider FO and other
sources, also gives glimpses into the role played by inter-war Foreign Secretaries, revealing a
love–hate relationship with intelligence. The influence of intelligence on individual Foreign
Secretaries changed from individual to individual. The formidable Sir Robert Vansittart, who
dominated British diplomacy as Foreign Office PUS from 1930 to 1938, recalled Labour’s Arthur
Henderson – a Methodist teetotaller – comparing ‘Secret Service’ to ‘hard liquor, because he
knew, and wanted to know, nothing of it’. As a result, Vansittart supposedly hid intelligence esti-
mates and other ‘secret service’-related material in the volumes of paperwork reaching
Henderson’s desk.17 As in Henderson’s case, most Foreign Secretaries had little interest in the
day-to-day running of the intelligence. Even if they had wanted to know more, the exacting
workload in shaping Britain’s foreign relations had to be managed alongside Cabinet responsibil-
ity and wider party-political issues, though Henderson and his successors were certainly privy to
the fruits of Britain’s foreign intelligence agencies. Part of the problem also stemmed from the
lack of a central machinery to assess the collected intelligence. Even with the formation of the
JIC in July 1936, which increasingly dealt with national assessments for ‘high powered people’,
the majority of SIS and GC&CS reports went directly to the FO’s political departments and even
the Secretary of State.18 Under the circumstances, the consumers became their own analyst with
mixed results. Lord Curzon saw GC&CS reports as an indispensable aid to diplomacy, even sub-
mitting an official protest drawing on SIGINT sources to the Soviet government (the ‘Curzon ulti-
matum’) calling for an end to subversive activity in Asia.19 Curzon also saw SIS as an important
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source; a 1919 assessment by the War Cabinet Committee, chaired by him, described Britain’s
overseas intelligence networks (known as MI1(c) and soon to be officially renamed SIS) as ‘The
Foreign Office’s service’.20 As with his sometimes erratic handling of SIGINT, Curzon was not
immune from compromising ‘secret service’ sources; against the advice of his advisors, the
Foreign Secretary sent another protest note to Moscow about alleged Soviet influence in Ireland
and India based on SIS material, sources later discredited.21 Nonetheless, Curzon had a ‘better
grasp’ of intelligence than any other Minister in government.22 While Labour’s Ramsay
MacDonald, who served jointly as Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, was reportedly kept in
the dark about GC&CS’s reports, his successor Sir Austen Chamberlain frequently saw them, fam-
ously agreeing to a raid on the headquarters of the All-Russian Co-operative Society searching
for stolen War Office documents, a raid justified by the publication of GC&CS intercepts in 1927,
with disastrous implications for Britain’s SIGINT against Russia.23 Lord Halifax was also privy to
the intelligence coming through normal diplomatic channels, Vansittart’s private networks and
the intelligence services, supporting a policy of appeasement towards Germany.24
Added to the everyday burdens of office, Foreign Secretaries have also had to endure a
‘degree of irritation, actual or potential’ in their relationship with Downing Street, a relationship
hardly helped by the intelligence dimension.25 As Eden’s wartime example illustrates, Winston
Churchill’s avid love of spies and secrets inevitably brought Downing Street uncomfortably into
British diplomacy, with most Secretaries of State since 1945 having to face Premiers often willing
to use ‘secret service’ to push their own agenda, much to the annoyance of the FO.26 The diplo-
mat Sir Nicholas Henderson remarked that all Prime Ministers ‘love intelligence, because it’s a
sort of weapon’, giving power in the corridors of Whitehall.27 Churchill certainly weaponised
intelligence, from the spring of 1941 using his own daily access to a selection of the most
important military and diplomatic decrypts to discomfort the Chiefs of Staff, and surprise an
overburdened Eden and his officials. Churchill’s continued involvement in foreign affairs
remained a point of contention during the Conservative peacetime administration from 1951 to
1955, which saw, in effect, ‘two men acting as Foreign Secretary at the same time’.28
The use of intelligence by Eden is a major gap in our understanding of his role as Foreign
Secretary, especially during his first two periods as Secretary of State, 1935–1938 and 1940–1945.
Eden is a fascinating focus for historical inquiry, having had a long and distinguished diplomatic
career, serving in the junior posts of Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1931–1933) and
Minister for the League of Nations, a post combined with Lord Privy Seal (December 1933–June
1935), becoming the youngest Foreign Secretary of the Twentieth Century at the age of just 38
in December 1935, holding the post until his resignation in February 1938. Eden escaped the
‘guilty men’ verdict that destroyed the reputation of so many colleagues in the inter-war period,
before his recall to government as Secretary of State for the Dominions (1939–1940) and
Secretary of State for War at the start of the Second World War. Returning to the FO in
December 1940, Eden’s wartime record was second only to Churchill’s. His prolonged spell as
Foreign Secretary was combined with the post of Leader of the House of Commons, a significant
role in the War Cabinet whilst acting as Churchill’s close confident and heir apparent, remaining
in frontbench politics after the end of the war as de facto Leader of the Opposition, supporting
an ailing Churchill. Even out of office, Eden was seen, as his one-time Private Secretary Valentine
Lawford commented, as ‘Foreign Secretary by divine right’ before his last tenure in the FO
(October 1951–April 1955).29
What we know of Eden and intelligence is largely restricted to his tenure in Downing Street
and notably the Suez Crisis of 1956. The available archive reveals what former FCO Chief
Historian Gill Bennett has called a ‘complicated story, rooted in the global nature of British over-
seas interests, fierce Anglo-American rivalry in the Middle East, and Arab nationalism set in a
Cold War context, as well as a host of personal and political considerations’ even if much of the
intelligence dimension is missing from the story, thanks to the closure of SIS and GCHQ
records.30 Nonetheless, historians have tried to understand Eden’s use of secret intelligence
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during the crisis with Egypt, painting an unflattering picture. Overall, it’s been argued that Eden
ignored the balanced assessments of the JIC, believing, instead, that Egypt’s President Gamel
Abdel Nasser was a Soviet proxy irrevocably hostile to the West, thanks partially to the informa-
tion supplied by an SIS source codenamed LUCKY BREAK.31 For former JIC Chair Sir Percy
Cradock, Eden regarded himself ‘as an authority … and he was already falling into the danger-
ous practice of selecting the pieces of intelligence that fitted his preconceptions’.32 For Richard J.
Aldrich and Rory Cormac, Eden ‘abused intelligence and attempted to co-opt MI6 into launching
its own secret foreign policy’, a point echoed by the JIC official historian Michael Goodman who
suggested that the JIC’s ‘steady line’ towards Egypt differed to Eden’s fixation with ‘removing
Nassar with covert plans’.33 Whatever the truth, our understanding of Eden and intelligence is
largely shaped by his Suez performance – a view, as this article shows – that does not sit well
with Eden’s earlier use of intelligence in the Foreign Office.
The literature on Eden is certainly a crowded field, thanks to the debate about his life and
reputation, with at least six major biographies and countless more books and articles, yet the
subject of intelligence remains absent from much of the literature, with the exception of the
Suez Crisis – partially down to Eden himself.34 Like most politicians of his day, Eden was reluc-
tant to talk about ‘secret service’ activity, providing vague references to ‘information’, ‘secret
sources’ and ‘intelligence’ in his memoirs. This may have been self-censorship, with Eden’s pri-
vate papers often silent on the issue; his diaries, already sparse, contain little on intelligence-
related matters, beyond references to the factious relationship with Hugh Dalton, Minister for
Economic Warfare. In one entry for April 1941, Eden referred to discussions of the Defence
Committee ‘so secret that I cannot write of it here’.35 In 1944, replying to suggestions from
Dalton, now President of the Board of Trade, that details of ‘Danegeld’ transactions, the secret
smuggling of Swiss produced goods with military value, including watches, timing devices, and
other specialist equipment across Nazi-occupied Europe to Britain through neutral countries,
could be revealed to Cabinet, Eden scribbled: ‘Secret organisations must remain secret. I haven’t
read this in detail but note 100 copies have been printed! They clearly should NOT be circu-
lated’.36 Nonetheless, despite Eden’s reluctance to discuss intelligence, new studies suggest that
Eden was generally a ‘good’ analyst with a ‘natural’ flair for secret diplomacy, in wartime becom-
ing a firm supporter of the FO Research Department, realising the importance of non-secret (or
open source) information, while also benefiting from SIS and GC&CS’s secret products.37 In
December 1943, Eden even became minister responsible for the Security Service (MI5), receiving
summaries of MI5’s work from Director-General Sir David Petrie, in a rare example of one individ-
ual being responsible for SIS, MI5 and GC&CS at the same time.38
Eden enjoyed a long relationship with British intelligence, even if he was reluctant to admit it.
In December 1937, Eden wrote to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain about the outgoing FO
PUS Sir Robert Vansittart. As PUS since 1930, Vansittart (or ‘Van’) had been at the heart of
Britain’s intelligence effort, and wanted to continue his grasp of ‘secret service’ following his
move to the newly established post of government Chief Diplomatic Advisor. For Vansittart this
was a ‘sine qua non’ – an essential condition for the job – but, as Eden explained to
Chamberlain, this was currently handled by PUS, with Eden ‘reluctant’ to deprive Vansittart’s
successor, Sir Alexander Cadogan, of ‘a service which has always been the prerogative of the
post’. Eden admitted to knowing little about ‘secret service’ which was ‘under the personal [and]
exclusive control’ of the PUS. ‘The Secretary of State has nothing to do with it’, Eden told
Chamberlin, ‘and I at least have always avoided knowing anything about it in detail’.39 Yet,
Eden’s claim he had little to do with intelligence was misleading. Like his predecessors, Eden
saw intelligence reports after replacing Sir Samuel Hoare as Foreign Secretary in December 1935,
even if examples of its use remain limited, thanks partially to the restricted nature of the archive
and strict adherence to rules not to refer to secret intelligence in papers. In a later review, former
Cabinet Secretary Lord Hankey warned that the ‘utmost care’ was needed when dealing with
GC&CS’s intelligence and that under ‘no circumstances should it be referred to in Cabinet
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Minutes or any circulated documents’.40 As a result, every effort was made to hide traces of sig-
nals intelligence (SIGINT) and other covert sources, though examples can be found.41
The FO of the mid-1930s was faced with Nazi Germany’s efforts to revise the political and
military settlements reached under the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, although the impact of intelli-
gence on British ‘appeasement’ policy is debatable.42 GC&CS’s inability to read Nazi Germany’s
military and diplomatic traffic placed growing emphasis on SIS reporting, Vansittart’s confidential
contacts and diplomatic reports from Britain’s Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Eric Phipps. Despite the
importance of some of these sources, intelligence had little impact on the emerging consensus
in Whitehall that Germany would become the ‘ultimate potential enemy’, with the work of key
committees such as the Defence Requirements Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial
Defence frequently based on ‘overt information and common sense to strategic and political
assessments’.43 Nonetheless, Eden certainly saw intelligence, forwarding Secretary of State for Air
Philip Cunliffe-Lister reports of Germany’s expanding Luftwaffe ‘from a source which the Foreign
Office regard as in a sense the most secret and the best informed’, adding to wider discussions
across government on the strength of the German air force.44 In February 1936, Eden also shared
a document prepared by Vansittart on Germany, citing ‘secret information’ that advocates of an
expansionist foreign policy had not ‘renounced their aspirations in the West’, likely drawing on
networks organised by the former British Air Attache to Berlin, Malcolm Grahame Christie.45 In
April 1937, Eden gave the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy a summary of a ‘very reliable
source’ pointing to German military concerns at the pace of rearmament, citing the
‘precariousness of her food and raw materials’.46 In July, Eden refused to circulate a similar ‘Most
Secret’ report from Vansittart, based on discussions with the German conservative anti-Nazi polit-
ician Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, including information from Werner von Fritsch Commander-in-
Chief of the German Army and Chief of the General Staff Ludwig Beck. Writing to Eden,
Vansittart accepted that the information, if leaked, would have ‘really grave consequences’, writ-
ing on his copy of the document ‘Suppressed by Eden’.47 By 1938, shortly before his resignation
as Foreign Secretary, SIS provided further information on growing tensions within Germany, with
Cadogan writing in his diary that SIS’s Chief (‘C’) Sir Hugh ‘Quex’ Sinclair:
… came round in afternoon with interesting information. [Hans] Frank’s advertised visit to London is ‘off’.
Berlin say they can’t give reason. When pressed – as arrangements have already been made here – all they
will say is ‘Mussolini’. Does this mean that lunatic is going off the deep end in the Mediterranean? I have
taken precautions. Press story is that there’s trouble in Germany – Reichwehr (Blomberg) versus Party
(Himmler) – and that it is over Musso’s scheme for intensification of the campaign in Spain. Maybe. Told A.
about it and told him to tell P.M.48
While certainly valuable in revealing tensions in the Nazi hierarchy, reports on Germany rein-
forced the consensus in government that Germany was the primary threat to Britain’s interests
in Europe – a view already reached through non-secret sources, reaffirming the need for an
improvement in Anglo-German relations through a policy of appeasement.49
Intelligence was more important in shaping the FO (and Eden’s) picture of Fascist Italy’s belli-
cose policy in the Mediterranean. In October 1935, Italian forces invaded Abyssinia starting a war
that would eventually isolate Italy from the international community50, while by July 1936 Italy
had also become involved in Spain’s Civil War supporting a rebellion by nationalist rebels
opposed to the popular front government in Madrid. The most reliable information on Italian
military and diplomatic activity was provided by GC&CS. In the 1920s, Britain’s codebreakers had
been able to read Italy’s naval ciphers, and Mussolini’s expansion into Abyssinia and support for
Spain’s nationalists generated significant traffic for GC&CS to attack. By 1936, GC&CS were also
reading Italian diplomatic messages.51 In April 1936, its first Head Alistair Denniston reported the
growing intelligence ‘available to all interested departments’, but pointed to future funding con-
cerns owing to Admiralty and FO reluctance to support the long-term installation of teleprinter
lines to bring raw intercept directly to GC&CS in London.52 Discussions about the funding of
GC&CS’s activities were even brought to Eden’s attention, though his views are unrecorded, and
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the question of funding liability was left to the Treasury to decide.53 By 1938, GC&CS was pro-
ducing an average of 240 reports a month with an estimated 20% relating to Italian actions and
policy.54 The growth of intelligence available to the FO, read alongside reports from diplomatic
missions and open sources, contributed to the increasingly pessimistic view of Italian policy.55
GC&CS’s decrypts of Italian naval messages especially gave the Admiralty and FO valuable intelli-
gence on the movement of Italian submarines before and during the Nyon conference in
September 1937, leading to a short term halt in attacks on shipping, though the agreement did
little to halt Italy’s support for the Nationalists.56 As early as October 1937, Eden’s Private
Secretary, Oliver Harvey, recorded the ‘fresh evidence we have that Muss is already breaking his
undertaking given since Nyon … sending further men and aeroplanes’.57
In 1938, the growth of intelligence contributed to Eden’s open breach with Chamberlain over
the policy of appeasement, resulting in the former’s resignation; on Germany, Chamberlin and
Eden agreed war should be avoided at all costs, yet differed over how to deal with Rome.58
Chamberlain believed that recognising Mussolini’s annexation of Abyssinia would improve rela-
tions, disagreeing with his Foreign Secretary, who wanted to see an improvement in Italy’s atti-
tude to London first. Writing to the Prime Minister in January 1938, Eden referred to ‘certain
reports which have recently reached me (and I am asking the most interesting one to be shown
to you on your return) indicating that Mussolini … is not likely to modify his policy in the near
future if he gets recognition or not’.59 Evidence of Mussolini’s hostility to Britain came from the
decrypted messages of Ishii Kikujiro, Japan’s Ambassador to Rome, sent in early December.
‘Englishmen over-ate and were surfeited’, Mussolini told Kikujiro, while Britain was ‘out of touch’
with the rest of the world, with Eden described as ‘a fool’ destroying relations with Rome.60
Eden subsequently reproduced evidence supporting his pessimistic line, possibly drawing on
GC&CS’s decrypts of Italian activity in Abyssinia, during a personal meeting with Chamberlain at
Chequers, writing in his diary:
… I told him my own views that we should do our best to improve [Anglo] German relations and in the
meanwhile continue our negotiations with Germany, but not at the present make any approaches to Italy.
Every instinct was against recognition of conquest of [Abyssinia] at this time. I then showed [Neville] file
containing latest [Abyssinian] reports. I reminded him that last year, when we made the so-called
“Gentleman’s agreement” with Italy, Mussolini sent four thousand men to Spain a week after. I feared I had
no more confidence in him now.61
Chamberlain remained opposed to Eden’s line, preferring to engage in talks with Rome – an
outcome Eden reluctantly supported. Yet, tensions shortly re-emerged, this time over Italy’s sup-
port for Nazi Germany’s long term aim of Anschluss with Austria following Hitler’s demands for
Nazification of the Austrian government in February. In London, Eden suspected Mussolini had
given tacit support, a view rejected by Chamberlain. During a meeting with the Italian
Ambassador to London, Dino Grandi, the Prime Minister asked about the existence of a ‘secret
agreement between the Fuhrer and Duce’ where Italy had agreed to growing German influence
in Austria in return for support over Italy’s aims in the Mediterranean. Grandi replied the informa-
tion was ‘false’, with Chamberlain openly contradicting his Foreign Secretary, leading Grandi to
describe the two as ‘enemies … like two cocks in true fighting posture’.62 Eden secretly knew of
an agreement, thanks to GC&CS’s earlier intercepts of Japanese diplomatic traffic; in October
1937, the Japanese Foreign Ministry learnt that Hitler and Mussolini acknowledged ‘the special
interests of Italy in the Mediterranean, while Italy recognized those of Germany in regard to
Austria’.63 Unable to confront Grandi over the lies, fearing compromising the source, and faced
with a Prime Minister who wanted to continue talks regardless, Eden was increasingly isolated.64
On 20 February, following intensive Cabinet discussions, Eden resigned citing his opposition to
talks with Rome. The resignation was a national and international event, receiving mixed recep-
tion from the press, but widespread public support, although Eden did little to attack
Chamberlain during the gathering storm of the late 1930s.
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Eden’s return to government in September 1939 as Dominions Secretary, followed by an
appointment as Secretary of State for War in Churchill’s coalition in May 1940, would see his
access to intelligence resume. In November 1940, Eden’s name appears on the distribution list
for the JIC’s ‘Secret Situation Report’ drawing on information from ‘most secret’ sources provided
by GC&CS, now based at its war station at Bletchley Park.65 In August 1940, Eden even com-
plained there was ‘no information’ from German-occupied France, prompting Churchill to chas-
tise SIS (and the FO) for a ‘failure to produce more information’.66 Since the start of the war, the
FO had been a significant consumer of intelligence from SIS, GC&CS and its usual diplomatic
channels. Following the death of Sir Hugh Sinclair in November 1939, the department sought to
maintain a tight handle on this flow of information, by installing Sinclair’s deputy Col. (later
Major-General) Stewart Menzies, as ‘C’ over the alternatives proposed by the service ministries.67
In August 1940, after claims SIS was failing to provide intelligence to departments, Menzies met
Halifax to discuss dissemination. While Halifax acknowledged that much of the day-to-day intelli-
gence produced was of little value, Halifax, owing to similar material going to Churchill, wanted
to see ‘any reports of particular interest or importance’ to stop Churchill producing some ‘titbit
of information at the Cabinet culled from an S.I.S. report which the Foreign Secretary had never
heard of’.68 As a result, throughout the war Menzies kept the Foreign Secretary, PUS and senior
FO officials informed of any significant intelligence.
The management of a sometimes fractious intelligence community placed an additional bur-
den on an overworked Eden, who, from November 1942, was appointed Leader of the House of
Commons, in addition to attending the War Cabinet, Defence Committee and other important
bodies. The strained and even acrimonious relationship between the FO, SIS and SOE over con-
trol of Britain’s strategy for sabotage and subversion did little to ease the burden. In many
accounts of SOE, Eden and FO officials are painted as villains. SOE’s executive head, Sir Colin
Gubbins, never forgot how ‘Eden once kept him standing at attention for several minutes …
while the Foreign Secretary – velvet-slippered feet on the desk – read a novel’69. Certainly, under
intense pressure, the Foreign Secretary was famously prone to ‘tantrums’ and behaved – as one
Principle Private Secretary later recorded in his diary – ‘like a child’, though Eden’s temper
quickly subsided and ‘invariably followed by an access of such kindness’.70 Cadogan noted that
Eden was often in ‘a flap’ and ‘jumpy’, but recalled, having re-read his diary, that no Foreign
Secretary excelled Eden ‘in finesse … or in knowledge of foreign affairs’.71 Eden’s relationship
with the Ministers of Economic Warfare responsible for SOE – Dalton until February 1942 and
Lord Selborne (1942–1945) – was one source of antagonism. While Eden maintained a lengthy, if
strained, correspondence with Selborne, his relationship with Dalton was often stormy.
Personalities were an important factor, but the single most contentious point was the natural dif-
ference in outlook between the FO and SOE, with the latter’s plans to disrupt the Axis war effort
in occupied and neutral countries clashing with Britain’s diplomats. Nonetheless, Eden saw SOE
as an important arm of wartime strategy, telling the Defence Committee in September 1943 that
SOE’s operations were important, ‘judging that on balance the results … outweighed the occa-
sional political difficulties’.72 Eden’s temperamental, often vain, personality features heavily in his
biographies, yet the Foreign Secretary could also act with kindness towards his staff, colleagues
and even members of SOE. For example, in 1944, Christopher ‘Monty’ Woodhouse visited Eden’s
country home, Binderton, to discuss Balkan strategy.73 Eden expressed his ‘entire faith’ in
Woodhouse, writing of his ‘excellent work’, and pushing Selborne to give him a promotion.74
Eden would often be dragged into the political fallout from intelligence activities, something
that inevitably brought Churchill into FO affairs, fuelling Eden’s annoyance. In October 1942, for
example, an aircraft carrying Free French officer Louis Danielou (using the nom de geurre
‘Clamorgan’) crashed in neutral Spain carrying documents revealing SOE operations, an event
brought to Churchill’s attention by his intelligence advisor, Desmond Morton.75 The matter
caught Eden unaware; during a face-to-face meeting with Churchill, Eden said he knew nothing,
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blaming the matter on Morton – a man who Eden later wished ‘at the bottom of the sea’ – and
his ‘extravagant language’.76
GC&CS’s intercepts also gave Eden and the FO important insights into Axis activities, even if
they sometimes exacerbated tensions in the relationship with Churchill. Throughout the war,
both men remained close allies; Eden was closer to Churchill than any other Minister. ‘You are
my war machine’, Churchill told Eden, ‘I simply couldn’t replace you’.77 Despite the close bond,
there were tensions especially over Downing Street’s repeated interference in the handling of
foreign policy – a problem not just restricted, as Eden’s successors would realise, to the
Churchill-Eden relationship.78 In September 1941, having seen a series of messages from the
Italian minister to Afghanistan, regarding a British request to expel Germans from the country,
Churchill wanted action, explaining to Eden that, in his view, Britain had ‘an open door which
you should force at the earliest moment’.79 Cadogan wrote:
A. in a flap on the telephone … It’s hopeless conducting business like this. A. sees no papers, he is
dragged up to London for 24 hours, dines with P.M. They both happen to see an intercept which makes it
look as if we might get Germans out of Afghanistan. So they get on the hop, and I get messages to say
that it must be done at once. But there are considerations of which they are blissfully ignorant,
poor children.80
While certainly a cause of tension with Downing Street, intelligence provided the Foreign
Secretary and his FO official’s clear insights into German intentions, especially towards the
Balkans and Soviet Union. From February 1941, Eden and the Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
General Sir John Dill, were sent on a lengthy, and ultimately futile, Cabinet-backed diplomatic
and military mission, travelling to Cairo, Athens, Ankara and Belgrade, to build up an anti-Axis
Balkan bloc, driven by intelligence assessments of German plans – with intelligence often kept
out of accounts of Eden’s mission. On 1 January 1941, reporting from human intelligence
(HUMINT) and SIGINT forecast German moves against Greece in the spring of 1941, citing a
German military build-up in neighbouring Romania.81 Just days after reading the intelligence,
Eden told Churchill that Germany was ‘pressing forward her preparations in the Balkans with a
view to an ultimate descent on Greece’, suggesting March as the likely start of operations and
pushing for British assistance.82 The Greek government initially rejected an offer from Britain to
send military support, fearing the move would provoke Germany, but the death of Prime
Minster, Ioannis Metaxas, and his replacement by a pro-British government led the Greeks to ask
for help, resulting in a meeting of the Cabinet’s Defence Committee on 10 February. Eden
believed the best way to prevent the collapse of Britain’s interests would be to provide ‘effective
help’ to Athens, ensuring that Turkey would also be in a position to help, with Churchill arguing
that it would be ‘wrong to abandon’ the Greeks, and the Defence Committee agreeing that a siz-
able British force should be dispatched, proposing that Eden and Dill fly to the Middle East and
Balkans to pave the way.83
The bleak prospects facing the Balkan bloc were presented to Ministers the following day by
Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) Major-General Francis Davidson; assessments showed a
German buildup of 30 divisions, including 5 armored, of which 23 were in place. German forces
would be in a position to cross the Greek frontier by early March and would be in Athens within
a week.84 Faced with the intelligence, Eden and Dill’s mission suddenly became a race against
time to shore up a Balkan bloc before Germany and her allies struck, Eden concluding ‘we
should do everything in our power to bring the fullest measure of help to the Greeks at the ear-
liest possible moment’.85 Meeting the Greek King, politicians and military figures in Athens, Eden
cited the intelligence though disguising the actual source. ‘The Germans had progressed far in
the assembling of a striking force in Romania’, he revealed, consisting of ‘at least 23 divisions, 3
of which were armored and two motorised, together with … 400 to 500 aircraft’. German prepa-
rations in Bulgaria were well advanced, with Germany likely to try and pressure Greece into back-
ing down or carry out an all-out attack.86 During his mission, Eden was kept informed of
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decision making in London, including often vague summaries of the latest intelligence from
Downing Street. On 1 March, the Prime Minister wrote, ‘The obvious German move is to overrun
Bulgaria, further to intimidate Turkey by threat of air attacks, force Greece out of the war, and
then turn on Yugoslavia, compelling her to obey’.87 By the middle of the month, Churchill was
writing to Eden, now in Cairo, of the German decision to withdraw troops from Rhodes, citing ‘A
source, of which you are aware’.88 Other telegrams abased on Churchill’s ‘reading of the
Intelligence’ followed, even if this second hand reporting proved far from ideal.89 A final decision
to support Greece was taken by the Cabinet on 7 March, with intelligence suggesting the
Germans were unlikely to strike before the end of the month.90 Intelligence may have hastened
Eden’s efforts to shore up the Balkan bloc, yet the plan failed dismally. With Turkey unwilling to
help and the Yugoslav government ill-equipped, Greece received token British support. When
German forces attacked in early April, Belgrade and Athens quickly fell resulting in the hasty
withdrawal of British and Commonwealth forces, leaving the Greece and the Balkans under
Axis occupation.
Eden and the FO also used SIGINT to warn Moscow of the coming German invasion of the
Soviet Union, codenamed Operation Barbarossa. By the spring of 1941, despite rumours of an
impending attack, the JIC pointed to growing diplomatic and economic ties between Berlin and
Moscow, ruling out the prospect of war in the short-term.91 This position started to change; in
early June, the committee pointed to Germany’s aim of removing ‘powerful Soviet forces’ from
their Eastern frontier – an aim that could not, the JIC admitted, be ‘achieved without war’.92 Eden
informed the War Cabinet that German troop and air concentrations against Russia were increas-
ingly ‘in great haste’.93 Writing to Churchill, Eden expanded: ‘All the information points to German
concentrations against Russia being pressed with utmost speed and vigour … I see in intelligence
reports that the Germans are said to have withdrawn a part of their fighter defence force from
northern France’, pushing for greater RAF activity over Europe.94 Inside the FO, Deputy Under-
Secretary Sir Orme Sargent suggested that Germany’s military build-up was part of a war of nerves
designed to force concessions, or, at worst, a military gamble designed to solve the ‘Russian prob-
lem’. The destruction of a sizeable portion of the Red Army would allow Hitler to ‘demobilise a
considerable portion of his army and thus relieve the labour shortage … hampering German
industry’.95 Both Cadogan and Eden supported Sargent’s view, with the JIC’s assessment and
ULTRA evidence informing Eden’s attempt to tell Soviet Ambassador to London Ivan Maisky of the
threat. On the evening of 13 June, Eden, joined by the JIC’s chair Victor Cavendish Bentinck, met
Maisky at the FO. ‘I told the Ambassador’, Eden told Britain’s Embassy in Moscow:
… that we had been giving careful consideration to the information which had reached us from many
quarters of German concentrations against Russia. These reports had increased in significance in the last
forty-eight hours. I had already given the Ambassador some indication of our information, and, after
consultation with the Prime Minister, I had now a further communication to make him. … I did not wish to
attempt to prophesy as to what might be the purpose of these concentrations, yet there are certain
obvious possibilities. They might be for the purpose of a war of nerves, or they might be for the purpose of
an attack on Russia.96
Cavendish Bentinck recalled talking to the Soviet Ambassador for twenty minutes, even sug-
gesting the attack ‘would take place either on 22 or 29 June and that I would put my money on
the 22nd’.97 Maisky remained sceptical of the warnings, telling Eden of his confidence that
Germany would not attack, though this self-assurance was quickly demolished during a briefing
from Cadogan 3 days later, during which the PUS, armed with a map showing German military
concentrations, gave ‘particulars’ of the build-up.98. Britain’s efforts to warn Moscow of the
impending German attack proved futile, thanks to Moscow’s continuing scepticism and suspi-
cions that talk of a German offensive were part of a strategy to drive a wedge between the
Moscow-Berlin alliance beginning with the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, leading to almost
complete surprise when Barbarossa was launched on 22 June.
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For all the talk of ULTRA, the FO received little military SIGINT compared with the service
departments, with knowledge of GC&CS’s success against Enigma restricted to a small circle.
Initially, only the PUS and the FO’s chair of the JIC knew.99 Before the invasion of Norway in the
spring of 1940, an estimated thirty people across government – the Prime Minister, a select few
in the War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff and advisors – had been indoctrinated.100 Cadogan was
one of them; in January 1941 he was given a personal tour of Bletchley Park, writing in his diary
‘Very interesting – I should like to spend a week there so as to try and understand it. [A] charm-
ing young Cambridge professor of Geometry – [Gordon] Welchman did his best with me. A
good show, I think’.101 On a practical level, there was little need for Enigma decrypts in the FO;
the diplomats were focused on winning the ‘diplomatic war’ not the military one, though Eden
did receive summaries of ULTRA based on discussions between the Chiefs of Staff and JIC, sent
by Cavendish Bentinck.102 The department remained the main beneficiary of GC&CS’s diplomatic
reporting, known as ‘Blue Jackets’ (or BJs) thanks to their distinctive covers. In 1939, diplomatic
code-breaking had moved with the rest of GC&CS to Bletchley Park, but in 1942 work on diplo-
matic and commercial codes moved back to the heart of London at Berkeley Street, Mayfair,
under Alistair Denniston, GC&CS’s interwar head and now its Deputy Director (Civil), eventually
expanding to over 250 staff.
As with SIS’s ‘CX’ reports, responsibility for receiving and distributing GC&CS’s products lay
with the PUS and their Private Secretaries, acting as a filter for the Secretary of State. While
Cadogan never had a passion for intelligence, even sharing his ‘misgivings about “Secret”
Reports’ in 1939103, the PUS and his staff were responsible for managing intelligence; Harry
Hopkinson, Cadogan’s Private Secretary, liaised with the agencies, being replaced by Peter
Loxley in June 1941, who remained Cadogan’s Private Secretary and an important figure
coordinating the FO’s relationship with the intelligence services, until his death in a plane
crash in 1945.104 In June 1943, Loxley set out the role of Private Secretary in dealing with
diplomatic intercepts. Material produced by Berkeley Street’s diplomatic section was sent to
him to sift.105 For Patrick Reilly, who experienced first-hand the pressures Loxley was under
while working as Private Secretary to Menzies (1942–1943), the workload was ‘frightening’:
… To support him he had only John Addis … and Sir Godfrey Thomas, Private Secretary to the Duke of
Gloucester … In addition there was a devoted tem of three supporting women, led by the wise and
admirable Mrs Watts, who had ruled us all so efficiently in the League of Nations Delegation … Over this
small band Peter Loxley, although in indifferent health, presided with the calm and cheerful competence
and authority which made his tragic death early in 1945 such a grievous loss to the Service.106
The volume of diplomatic material was significant; adding to the ever-increasing German mili-
tary material, Berkeley Street read Italian, Japanese, Vichy (and Free) French traffic and eventually
German diplomatic ciphers, in addition to those of neutrals including Turkey, Portugal, Spain,
Ireland and Switzerland and others. The ciphers of allies in Latin America (especially Brazil) as
well as the Belgians, Chinese, Greeks and Poles were also attacked.107
Japanese decodes were especially important in shaping British policy in the Far-East, support-
ing Eden and the FO’s efforts to deter a Japanese attack against Britain’s Far-Eastern possessions.
Since early 1941, thanks to help from American codebreakers, GC&CS had been able to read
high-level diplomatic messages from Japan’s diplomatic cypher, Purple.108 These reports gave
the British government important indications of tensions with Tokyo, which grew in intensity
after a ‘war scare’ in February 1941, when phone tapping against the Japanese Embassy in
London picked up warnings to ‘leave London at sudden notice’.109 Cadogan noted in his diary
that the intelligence looked ‘very ominous’. Eden wrote to Churchill: ‘You should see these’.110
More bad news followed; the next day, after talks at in the Admiralty, Cadogan noted ‘more very
bad-looking Jap telephone conversations, from which it appears they have decided to attack us.
A. was seeing Hopkins and I went in and guardedly gave them the news’.111 Eden read the tran-
scripts, telling the War Cabinet:
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… on the previous day most secret information had been received that Japan had warned her Embassy
staff in London to reduce their contacts with the British authorities to a minimum, and be prepared to leave
the country at short notice. He had sent a telegram to Washington containing this information.
Acting on this intelligence, Eden proposed to see the Japanese Ambassador, Shigemitsu, and
‘give him a frank review of the present position as we saw it’, despite the risk to intelligence
sources.112 In his diary, Eden wrote the intelligence ‘seems to show Jap preparations for some
coup, perhaps against us’.113 Seeing Shigemitsu, Eden spoke ‘slowly from a brief, so that he might
take it all down. He appeared taken aback at what I had said [and] doubted whether Tokyo would
like The [sic] message. He told R.A.B. [Butler] later that I had been very firm. I only hope it has
some effect … I am a bit worried about it, I admit’.114 Eden returned to the passage in
September 1941, adding: ‘Many months afterwards we learnt that … warning given … only
caused them to change their plans – we do not know what exactly they were planning, only that
it was against us’.115 It is uncertain whether Eden’s entry was inspired by more Japanese intercepts,
as the nature of the archive yields little on what the Foreign Secretary saw day-to-day, but it is
hard to believe that such information, often sent to Churchill, would not have reached Eden’s
desk, especially given the Foreign Secretary’s aim of deterring a Japanese assault in the Far-East.
In late 1941, Loxley wrote to Menzies that ‘the material we receive from B.J.’s and other secret
sources about the Far-East is so important these days’, and copies of diplomatic intercepts were
distributed widely.116 Three sets went to the FO; as Loxley’s successor Tom Bromley explained,
‘One of these sets is kept on file by my secretaries (the most important being shown direct to
Sir. A. Cadogan and the Secretary of State for their immediate information)’.117 Copies were also
sent to the FO’s Political Intelligence Department (PID – later renamed the Foreign Office
Research Department), the Admiralty, War Office, Colonial Office, India Office, Air Ministry,
Cabinet Secretary and other parts of Whitehall.118 The problem for Ministers, officials and the
military was that the intercepts were often open to interpretation. In July 1941, following an
Imperial Conference, GC&CS decrypted a message from Tokyo to Japan’s Berlin Embassy suggest-
ing that that Tokyo would strike southwards against French Indochina, leaving options for a
strike into Eastern Siberia.119 Shortly afterwards, in a memorandum prepared for the War
Cabinet, Eden told colleagues of the ‘sure information to the effect that the Japanese
Government, while preparing for all eventualities in Eastern Siberia, do not intend to take action
there in the immediate future; but that they have decided to acquire points d’appui in Indo-
China in order to increase pressure upon Great Britain and the United States’, possibly through
diplomatic means, though ‘force’ remained an option. This information could not be ‘utilized
publicly without compromising its source’, with Eden presenting a series of options for British
policy, ranging from economic to political sanctions and the improvement of defences in British-
held Malaya.120 Later in the month, BJs showed that Japan had decided to ‘seize bases in Indo-
China – by the 20th’ threatening Malaya. On 15 July, during a meeting in Downing Street, Eden
and Cadogan met with Churchill, Menzies and the First Sea Lord to discuss the response, with
Cadogan noting ‘P.M. approved our proposed action – publicity, and consultation with U.S. … if
and when Jap move becomes patent’.121 British policy, guided by the intelligence, aimed to
deter Japanese expansion with measured responses to Tokyo’s belligerency, even if Churchill and
others thought an attack highly unlikely, rejecting Eden’s plans to coordinate defence with the
Dutch East-Indies. During Cabinet on 21 July, Eden again used intelligence (‘we know that the
Japanese have it in mind … seize bases in Indo-China, which pan only be a threat to Malaya
and the Netherlands East Indies, we cannot hesitate longer’) to give a political commitment to
the Dutch.122 Churchill baulked at the move, Cadogan writing that the Prime Minister was
‘frightened of nothing but Japan … tiresome discussion. A. fought him and, of course, no sup-
port’.123 Beyond tensions in the Far-East, diplomatic intercepts also revealed contacts between
members of Churchill’s inner circle and the Japanese Embassy in London in September 1941,
prompting Churchill to ask Eden for ‘information’. Five individuals were in contact with the
Embassy, replied Eden, including William Forbes-Sempill, 19th Lord Sempill, a pioneer inter-war
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aviator with links to Japanese officials, currently employed at the Admiralty, despite security con-
cerns since the 1920s. Eden went on to act as a conduit for Downing Street in sending the
results of MI5 bugging of Sempill’s telephone, revealing clandestine contacts with Japanese offi-
cials, resulting in efforts to remove Sempill’s access to secret information.124 Even in late 1941,
the BJs reaching Whitehall were often ambiguous; while war seemed one option, the intercepts
also gave details of Japan’s diplomatic approach to the United States, luring policymakers into a
false sense of security. It was only by December 1941 that Japan’s true intentions began
to emerge.
GC&CS’s diplomatic reporting remained an important source of information throughout the
war. By mid-1943, the serial numbers of circulated decrypts reached one hundred thousand and
the FO received a monthly average of eight-hundred to one-thousand messages. From April to
September 1944, for example, Berkeley Street produced over 6,700 reports, averaging over 1,000
each month.125 In May 1944, roughly 21% of all reports were Japanese, 12% German and 13%
Vichy (and Free) French. In June alone 22% of intercepts were Japanese, with 16% coming from
Free and Vichy French ciphers. Roughly 8 to 10% were Portuguese, while around 8% came from
Turkish traffic, proving useful in interpreting Ankara’s policy as a neutral.126 Loxley and his staff
sifted the latest intelligence, marking out the most important for the relevant heads of depart-
ment. Circulation was fairly wide; in 1945, Bromley reported that papers were delivered to
departments in red boxes by messenger and that nearly all departments saw intercepts.127 In
1943, Colonel Alfred McCormack, then deputy head of the US Army’s Special Branch, responsible
for the War Department’s SIGINT, reported to Washington, that everything ‘goes to [the] Foreign
Office … what impressed us was the pains that are taken to see that all information gets out to
those who can make use of it’.128 Other than circulating relevant intelligence around the Foreign
Office, the PUS’s Private Secretary also had the task of reading entire sets of ‘flimsies’ and select-
ing the ‘most interesting’ for Cadogan, who submitted ‘any which he thinks are of sufficient
importance to our Secretary of State’.129
The impact of this intelligence is hard to assess. Unlike military reporting which had a clear
cause and effect, diplomatic intelligence contributed to ‘long-term’ knowledge.130 Reporting to
Washington, McCormack said it was ‘impossible to exaggerate how many surprises you would
get from looking at these records’.131 For all the difficulties in judging impact, the FO and Eden
certainly valued the information. In October 1942, following Berkeley Street’s first break into
Germany’s diplomatic cipher, Eden sent a congratulatory message:
It is a very remarkable achievement on the part of the Code and Cypher School to have broken this cypher.
I have heard something of the months, and indeed years, of labour which members of the School have put
into their task and I am more than delighted to know that their efforts have at last been rewarded with the
success which they deserved. Will you please convey my warmest congratulations and thanks to all
concerned?132
Cadogan was equally impressed, ‘I suppose the wizards who do these things (and have
already done so much in this … ) make a big own individual contribution to the winning of the
war as anyone else’.133 The letter was well received; Menzies replied that GC&CS’s German sec-
tion was ‘highly gratified’.134 By 1943, showing his appreciation for Berkeley Street’s work, Eden
gave Denniston a dinner at the Cafe Royal in central London, followed by tickets for a show.135
In June 1944, Loxley pressed for another congratulatory message for Berkeley Street after the
interception of a message from Japan’s Ambassador in Berlin, General Oshima Hiroshi, detailing
discussions with Hitler, setting out his views on the forthcoming allied invasion of Europe.
According to Oshima, Hitler believed the Allies would launch diversionary raids, before a cross-
channel assault in Normandy or Brittainy. The ‘real second front’ would soon follow in the Pas-
de-Calais, showing that Hitler, and German intelligence, had been fooled by Allied deception.
‘GERMANY would like nothing better than to be given an opportunity of coming to blows with
… the enemy as soon as possible’, he confidently told Oshima.136 Loxley wrote that Denniston’s
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team provided a ‘first class service’. A follow up message, drafted and sent by Cadogan with
Eden’s blessing, acknowledged the importance of the work (‘the material which they handle is
frequently of the greatest interest and importance and we are greatly indebted to them both for
the excellence of their translations and for the speed which they furnish them’) and conveyed
the Foreign Secretary’s ‘warm congratulations’.137
Releases confirm the educational role of diplomatic reporting, with very few actions resulting
from the BJs handed to diplomats. In part, this seems to stem from attempts to protect the
source. In July 1943, referring to the use of diplomatic intelligence, Loxley explained that BJs
would only be used as the basis for action in the ‘rarest possible cases’ and only if the informa-
tion could be ascribed to a ‘completely different source’.138 In many cases, Eden was shown the
text of intercepts initialling them or scribbling short comments. In January 1943, for example,
the Foreign Secretary saw a Turkish diplomatic intercept reporting that President Franklin
Roosevelt and Churchill were meeting at an undisclosed location.139 Only in a few cases was the
information actionable; in June 1942, GC&CS provided the FO with information that the Spanish
Foreign Minister, Ramon Serrano Su~ner, was to meet his Italian counterpart (and Eden’s long-
term nemesis) Count Galeazzo Ciano, near Leghorn. In a letter to the Chief of the Air Staff,
Cadogan said Eden wanted the meeting ‘warming up’ and asked whether anything could be
done; Portal replied that aircraft flying from Malta would be out of effective range, and that
British aircraft were already ‘fully engaged on a vitally important operation’.140 A year later, fol-
lowing a bombing raid on the German V-Weapons facility at Peenemunde, Eden instructed
Cadogan to send Portal a copy of an Oshima message suggesting that ‘the damage had been in
some degree repaired and that work had been resumed’.141 The flow of diplomatic intelligence
also gave Eden, Cadogan and a select few in the FO a unique window into the work of Britain’s
diplomatic missions; in October 1943, German diplomatic intercepts revealed Vice-Consul John
Whitfield, attached to Britain’s Embassy in Madrid, believed the Western allies need to ‘get to
BERLIN before the Russians’ – an anti-Soviet statement concerning FO officials trying to protect
the Anglo-Soviet alliance.142 The next month, reports from Japan’s Ambassador to Moscow sug-
gested that Britain’s flamboyant Ambassador Archibald Clark Kerr had personally insulted
Foreign Minister Molotov during a reception: ‘KERR had fallen over. Plates and glasses were lay-
ing in confusion and it was evident that something must have happened between MOLOTOFF
and KERR, who were arguing violently together … MOLOTOFF had turned livid’.143 The Turkish
Embassy reported that Kerr had been drunk, prompting London to ask for clarification from dip-
lomats in Moscow.144 During the war, over 72,000 reports were circulated to the FO, offering an
important window into the foreign affairs of Britain’s enemies, neutrals and allies.145 Diplomatic
reporting gave the FO behind-the-scenes access to the views of neutrals, while the high-level
Japanese traffic, especially Oshima’s reports, provided up-to-date information on all aspects of
Axis military and political thinking, helping to win the war against the Axis.
Eden’s biographers shed little light on the subject of intelligence before the events of 1956,
shaping our understanding of Eden as an intelligence consumer. Nonetheless, this article sug-
gests that during his early career, Eden was a diligent reader of intelligence, often interpreting
ambiguous reports to shape British diplomacy. In effect, Eden, Cadogan, and other senior FO offi-
cials (as in the case of other Secretaries of State) assessed the intelligence themselves, far from
easy in the absence of an experienced central intelligence staff. Meeting for the first time in July
1936, the JIC, strengthened by an assessments staff, over time grew to become an ‘integral part’
of Britain’s war effort supporting ‘decision making in all aspects of war planning’. The very sur-
vival of the JIC marked the beginnings of intelligence professionalisation, but historians must not
anachronistically see the JIC as playing a central role in all aspects of wartime intelligence, nor
see policymakers as just recipients of carefully worded assessments.146 Even in the 1950s, when
the JIC was placed in the Cabinet Office, providing strategic assessments to Ministers and senior
officials, much of SIS’s reporting bypassed the JIC with intelligence sent direct to ‘the customer’.
In wartime, the practice remained the same. In Downing Street, Churchill became his own
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intelligence assessor, reading a range of decrypts selected by Menzies, with mixed results.147 In
the FO, the interpretation of ‘CX Reports’ and diplomatic flimsies was left to the political depart-
ments, PUS or Secretary of State. As the experiences of Lord Curzon and Austen Chamberlain
how, the use of intelligence in these circumstances could be hit and miss. Yet, Eden’s grasp of
the intelligence – as well as those of his FO officials – proved remarkable, becoming a gifted
reader of the multiplicity of information moving across his desk, integrating secret intelligence
into government decision making, while becoming a supporter of foreign intelligence gathering.
Like other Secretaries of State, Eden was largely divorced from the day-to-day details of intelli-
gence work, but regularly saw the products of GC&CS and SIS’s efforts. From Mussolini’s inter-
war foreign policy to German wartime decision making and Japanese policy in the Far East, intel-
ligence gave Eden and the FO important insights into the diplomatic battle against the Axis,
even if much of the diplomatic intelligence was not actionable. Eden’s case also highlights the
role of intelligence in the FO-Downing Street relationship, exacerbating and already fractious
relationship at times over the conduct of foreign policy. For Eden, intelligence was a double-
edged sword, giving unrivalled insights into the policies of enemies, allies and neutrals alike until
the end of war in August 1945, but also offering Churchill the opportunity to encroach on
Eden’s ministerial brief. In this respect, Eden’s experience appears to be shared by other
Secretaries of State who have suffered from the unwanted attention of Downing Street. In look-
ing at Eden and intelligence, this article suggests that the study of Foreign Secretaries and intelli-
gence is important in understanding how foreign policy is crafted. It also begins to fill a
significant gap in the literature on Eden, looking at his relationship with British intelligence. The
picture presented so far is that Eden and his officials used intelligence to good effect in crafting
British foreign policy when ‘Facing the Dictators’.
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